advisers whether he had authority to move Congress's December session to some safer location. 4 Madison and Jefferson said no: Article II, § 3, which empowered the President to convene Congress on "extraordinary Occasions," authorized him to change only the time, not the place, of congressional meetings. 5 Fortunately, the epidemic subsided in time to permit Congress to assemble in Philadelphia as planned, and Congress avoided future embarrassment by giving the President the authority the Framers had arguably failed to provide. ' After admitting the public to the debate over Albert Gallatin's qualifications, 7 the Senate finally voted to open its doors generally during the conduct of "Legislative" business, but only after "suitable galleries" were built;' and it did not happen during the Third Congress. Moreover, press coverage of House proceedings was skimpier than ever before. Apart from the war issues, there was rather little reported debate; much of the Annals of Congress reads like the Senate Journal. But, as al-Hamilton ("Pacificus") and Madison ("Helvidius") over the relative powers of the President and of Congress in the realm of foreign affairs. 3 The principal objection to the proclamation was that, since only Congress could declare war, only Congress could commit us to peace. As Jefferson explained in a letter to Madison,
The [proclamation] as first proposed was to have been a declaration of neutrality. It was opposed on th [e] groun [d] ... that a declaration of neutrality was a declaration there should be no war, to which the Executive was not competent."
In response to Jefferson's concerns, however, the word "neutrality" (which was "understood to respect the future") was omitted from the proclamation. Thus, Hamilton was able to argue with considerable force in his first Pacificus essay that the objection lacked merit:
[The proclamation] only proclaims a fact with regard to the existing state of the Nation, informs the citizens of what the laws previously established require of them in that state, & warns them that these laws will be put into execution against [offenders] . 5 Congress remained "free to perform its own duties" as it saw fit; 6 it could declare war or not, as it chose.
Hamilton's argument was powerful but not quite decisive, for Washington had not stopped at declaring our present condition of peace. Rather, he had proclaimed the "disposition" of the United States to pursue a friendly and impartial policy in accordance with his view of our "duty and interest." In a letter to Jefferson, Papers of Thomas Jefferson 570 (Princeton 1992) . See also Miller, Federalist Era at 128-29 (cited in note 2); Editorial Note, in Catanzariti, et al, eds, 25 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 571.
'" These letters, which can be found in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 33-43, 55-63, 65-69, 82-86, 90-95, 100-06, 130-35 (cited in note 4) , and Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [95] [96] [97] [98] [99] [100] [101] [102] [103] (cited in note 3) respectively, were also published together by J. and G.S. Gideon in 1845 under the title The Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius (1845) with The Letters of Americanus (Delmar 1976) . 
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Madison took the position that in so doing Washington had gone too far.' Speaking to the public as Helvidius, Madison toned down his objection to avoid making it an attack on the popular President, explaining why use of the unfortunate term "disposition" did not justify interpreting the proclamation to declare a policy of peace:
Had the Proclamation prejudged the question on either side, and proclaimed its decision to the world; the Legislature, instead of being as free as it ought, might be thrown under the dilemma, of either sacrificing its judgment to that of the Executive; or by opposing the Executive judgment, of producing a relation between the two departments, extremely delicate among ourselves, and of the worst influence on the national character and interest abroad... . 8 Madison's concern should not be dismissed out of hand. In the converse situation Washington and his Cabinet scrupulously insisted on several early occasions that no one outside the executive branch communicate directly with foreign governments lest the President be embarrassed in his conduct of foreign affairs. [A] proclamation on the subject could not properly go beyond a declaration of the fact that the U.S. were at war or peace, and an enjunction of a suitable conduct on the Citizens. The right to decide the question whether the duty & interest of the U.S. require war or peace under any given circumstances, and whether their disposition be towards the one or the other seems to be essentially & exclusively involved in the right vested in the Legislature, of declaring war in time of peace; and in the P " When the House exuberantly voiced its approval of the new French constitution in 1792, Washington expressed concern that "the legislature would be endeavoring to invade the executive." Jefferson persuaded him not to protest, arguing that the House "had a right, independently of legislation, to express sentiments on other subjects," so long as, in the case of statements regarding foreign nations, "instead of a direct communication, they should pass their sentiments through the President. HeinOnline --63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 1996 Moreover, Hamilton's argument that the President had merely declared "the existing state of the Nation" seems not to have been entirely candid. In a later meeting to discuss what Washington should say to Congress about the proclamation, Hamilton was reported as saying that it had been intended as an expression of the President's opinion that war was contrary to our interests and that the President had every right to express his opinion."
However, Washington himself read the proclamation narrowly. "The President," Jefferson reported, "declared he never had an idea that he could bind Congress against declaring war, or that anything contained in his proclamation could look beyond the first day of their meeting." Sharing this interpretation, Jefferson said he was satisfied that the proclamation did not interfere with Congress's prerogatives: "I admitted the President, having received the nation at the close of Congress in a state of peace, was bound to preserve them in that state till Congress should meet again, and might proclaim anything which went no farther." 2 ' When the House unanimously voted felicitations to France four years later on the adoption of a new flag, the resolution respectfully requested the President to forward the House's sentiments to the French authorities, and he did. See 5 Annals of Cong 195-200 (Jan 4, 1796) ; Letter from George Washington to the President of the Directory of the French Republic (Jan 7, 1796), in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 34 The Writings of George Washington at 419 (US GPO 1940) . The Senate refused to go even that far, see 5 Annals of Cong 28-36 (Jan 5-6, 1796), after Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut objected that "[n]othing... could be found in the Constitution to authorize either branch of the Legislature to keep up any kind of correspondence with a foreign nation." 5 Annals of Cong 32 (Jan 6, 1796) . When Citizen Gendt brazenly persisted in addressing a French consul's credentials to Congress rather than to the President, Jefferson returned them with the curt reminder that the President was "the only channel of communication between this country and foreign nations .... [Blound to enforce respect to the order of things established by our Constitution, the President will issue no Exequatur to any consul or viceconsul, not directed to him in the usual form.... Office and Powers, 1787 -1957 208-09 (NYU 1957 .
In 1799 Congress recognized this principle by making it a crime for private citizens to negotiate with foreign governments without the President's consent. Logan Act, 1 Stat 613 (1799) , codified at 18 USC § 953 (1988) . See also the German Constitutional Court's decision, on similar grounds, that individual states had no power to conduct advisory referenda on the desirability of stationing nuclear weapons on German soil. 8 BVerfGE 104, 105 (1958) ; David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 79 (Chicago 1994) .
" Ana of Nov 8, 1793, in Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 177, 178 (cited in note 19). Compare Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power at 115 (cited in note 10) (arguing that by issuing and enforcing the proclamation without calling Congress into special session the President and his Cabinet unilaterally determined a policy of neutrality "for about a seven-month period"). 21 Ana of Nov 8, 1793, in Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 179 HeinOnline --63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7 1996 Hamilton, as Paciflicus, had made the same point: the fact that only Congress could declare war meant that the President had a "duty... to preserve Peace"; Washington would have intruded on legislative authority if he had not taken steps to prevent individuals from provoking a war that Congress had not declared." It is easy to see how hostile acts by the President himself may improperly interfere with Congress's power to determine whether or not to declare war." Before we can find that the President has a duty to take affirmative action to prevent similar actions by private parties, however, we must find that he has the power to do so, and it is not so obvious that he has.
Hamilton took the occasion to argue for the broadest possible interpretation of the opening clause of Article II, § 1, which declares that "the executive Power shall be vested in [the] President." This grant of authority, Hamilton argued, was not limited to the particular powers enumerated in the provisions that followed. "[Tihe difficulty of a complete and perfect specification of all the cases of Executive authority.., would render it improbable" in any event that the general terms of the Vesting Clause were meant to be restricted by the enumeration. 2 4 Moreover, this inference was reinforced by the contrast in phrasing between Articles I and II. For the first article conspicuously conferred on Congress only the "legislative powers herein granted"; the second contained no such restriction. Since the executive was the traditional "organ of intercourse... [with] foreign Nations," proclaiming our neutrality was an executive function; 26 and since it fell within none of the exceptions to the general principle expressed in the Vesting Clause, the President had acted within his powers. 2 (cited in note 19).
Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 To this day the crucial controversy over Hamilton's interpretation of the Vesting Clause has never been authoritatively resolved. 28 The difference in phrasing between Articles I and II is suggestive but not decisive; like other differences in phrasing, it may well have been accidental. The Vesting Clause was plainly designed to codify James Wilson's suggestion "that the Executive consist of a single person" rather than a committee; 29 the "herein granted" language in Article I was added without explanation by the Committee of Style, which was not supposed to make substantive changes." Indeed, to take seriously the omission of similar language from Article II might suggest that the President could exercise executive powers that have always been understood not to be federal at all, for the "herein granted" language of Article I is a principal source of the basic tenet that legislative powers not enumerated are reserved to the states. There is thus much to be said for concluding that, as has recently been urged, the Vesting Clause does nothing more than show "who has the executive power [,] not what that power is .... ,, But the validity of the neutrality proclamation does not stand or fall with Hamilton's all-encompassing approach to the Vesting Clause. To begin with, assuming that the declaration did not invade the powers of Congress, it would have sufficed to show that, as the Supreme Court has since concluded, the President had broad implicit authority over foreign affairs. 2 The wideevidence that both powers were legislative rather than executive. spread conviction that foreign relations was meant to be essentially a federal matter, as it had been under the Articles of Confederation; 3 the conspicuous advantages possessed by the executive in terms of the secrecy and dispatch essential to the conduct of foreign affairs; 3 4 the fact that foreign affairs remained a matter of royal prerogative in Great Britain; 5 and the meager list of foreign affairs powers expressly given to other branches all lend support to this conclusion. The express grants of foreign affairs authority to the President, of course, were equally sparse.
Madison's Helvidius papers demonstrated that he took no such latitudinarian view of presidential powers in foreign affairs; 3 1 even Hamilton's assumption that the federal government as a whole had plenary authority in this area would be hotly disputed in the debates over the controversial Aliens Act five years later.
7
But there was no need to adopt a broad view of the President's implicit or inherent foreign affairs powers in order to sustain the proclamation. Both Hamilton and Madison ultimately defended it as an exercise of his express constitutional duty to ' "It will not be disputed," wrote Hamilton, "that the management of the affairs of this country with foreign nations is confided to the Government of the Republic, 11 Hofstra L Rev 413, 511 (1982) (arguing that "the distribution of power shows clearly that the Framers intended the Congress to predominate in foreign policy").
1 Stat 570 (1798). Nevertheless, wrote Professor Corwin a century and a half afterward, "Hamilton's contention that the 'executive power' clause of the Constitution embraces a prerogative in the diplomatic field which is plenary except as it is curtailed by more specific clauses of the Constitution has consistently prospered." Corwin, President: Office and Powers at 252-53 (cited in note 19).
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Hamilton made this point at the end of his first Pacificus paper," and Madison acknowledged it in Helvidius. The danger that the actions of indiscreet citizens might involve us in an undeclared war and "the duty of the Executive to preserve peace by enforcing its laws," wrote Madison, "might have been sufficient grounds" for the President's action. 39 In bowing to the President's obligation to enforce the laws, Madison may have given away the strongest argument against the neutrality proclamation. Of course Article II, § 3 required the President to enforce the laws. But Article I, § 8 empowered Congress, not the President, to "define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations"; 40 and, with minor exceptions not here relevant, 4 ' Congress had not done so. Thus, in threatening to prosecute individuals who offended the law of nations, the President was arguably arrogating to himself or to the courts a power the Constitution had placed in Congress. 42 Congress had, of course, given the federal circuit courts jurisdiction over "all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States."' The law of nations, as the Supreme Court was soon to hold, was binding on the United States of its own force. 4 
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in upholding a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act giving federal courts jurisdiction over certain tort actions arising under international law, that the law of nations was a law of the United States within the meaning of Article III." It arguably follows, as Hamilton argued in Pacificus, that the law of nations was one of the "laws" the President was bound to enforce under Article II even in the absence of congressional action. 4 6 There are at least two challenges to the application of these arguments in the context of criminal prosecution. 4 7 First, authority to enforce customary international law in criminal cases is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's rejection of a federal common law of crimes' and with the concern for fair warning that helps to explain that decision. 4 9 Second, if offenses against the law of nations were already punishable, one wonders why Congress was given power in Article I, § 8 to proscribe them. Branch and International Law, 41 Vand L Rev 1205 , 1233 (1988 .
" The argument that the alien tort claims provision might be explained on the narrower ground that it implicitly federalized the law of nations or authorized the federal courts to do so (see Textile Workers Union v Lincoln Mills, 353 US 448, 450 (1957) ), however anachronistic, would seem to be equally applicable in the criminal context on the basis of § 11 of the same statute (see note 43), which gave the courts jurisdiction over federal crimes.
' United States v Hudson, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."). Justice Chase had taken this position on circuit as early as 1798; Judge Peters disagreed with him, and somehow the defendant was convicted. United States v Worrall, 28 F Cases 774, 766) The Convention record suggests possible answers to the latter question. The power to "punish" offenses seems to have been included in order to make clear that the subject was one of federal rather than state concern;" the power to "define" them was added because of a conviction that the law of nations was "often too vague and deficient to be a rule." 5 ' Neither of these explanations is necessarily inconsistent with the conclusion that the law of nations is binding on the courts of its own force in cases in which it can be fairly ascertained or that the President may take steps to enforce it even though Congress has not acted. 52 Moreover, the Supreme Court did not reject the notion of a federal common law of crimes until United States v Hudson in 1812," 3 and even then the law of nations was arguably distinguishable. Hudson was a garden-variety libel case, explainable in part by the legitimate fear that federal prosecution would undermine states' rights; no one argued that foreign relations should be left to the states." The opinion that the law of nations was one of the "laws" the President was bound to execute was widespread in 1793, and the text of the proclamation demonstrates that Washington shared that conviction. Thus, even if he was ultimately wrong on this question, his action did not represent a claim of presidential authority to create new criminal of- Years, 1789 -1888 11-14 (Chicago 1985 . The Justices' refusal was the more striking in that, only a few months before, Jay had responded lican press, the defendant argued that he had violated no enforceable law. The court, however, disagreed. By taking part in hostilities against nations with which we were at peace, Justice Wilson instructed the jury, Henfield had offended both the law of nations and treaties declaring a state of peace, and thus he had committed an offense against the United States."
Henfield was nevertheless acquitted. Jefferson thought the jury had been unwilling to punish a man who had not known he was breaking the law. 6 Some observers have hinted at nullification by "a pro-French jury,"" others that the jury may have accepted the argument that there could be no punishment in the absence of a statute. 63 In any event, the acquittal of Henfield dealt a severe blow to the policy of neutrality.' Although Washington accepted the view of the majority of his Cabinet that there was no need to call Congress into special session, 65 he made neutrality his first order of business when the Third Congress met in December 1793, informing the lawmakers of what he had done to preserve the peace and urging them "to extend the legal code and the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States to many cases which, ' Jefferson had favored a special session, in part "[blecause several Legislative provisions are wanting to enable the government to steer steadily through the difficulties daily produced by the war of Europe, and to prevent our being involved in it by the incidents and perplexities to which it is constantly giving birth." Opinion relative to the propriety of convening the Legislature at an earlier period than that fixed by law (Aug 4, 1793), in Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 441-42 (cited in note 19).
HeinOnline --63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 15 1996 though dependent on principles already recognised, demand some further provisions. " " Without recorded objection each House promptly praised the President for issuing his proclamation, 67 and Congress prescribed punishment for a number of crimes including those with which Henfield had been charged 6 --in exercise of its indisputable authority "to define and punish... offenses against the law of nations." 69 On March 24, 1794, Washington had issued a second proclamation warning that the enlistment of troops in Kentucky to attack the territories of a friendly power (Spain) wyas "contrary to the laws of nations" and calling on "courts, magistrates, and other officers" to suppress it. George Washington, Proclamation, in Richardson, ed, 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents at 157-58 (cited in note 10). Since the Neutrality Act had not yet been adopted, this proclamation too was based on the theory that the President had authority to enforce the unwritten law of nations. Other issues of presidential authority over foreign affairs were debated within the executive branch during the same period. In April, 1793, as it approved Washington's neutrality proclamation, the Cabinet unanimously agreed that he should receive the new French minister, Edmond Gen~t. Although Hamilton argued that to receive Genit was to recognize the new French government, no one suggested consulting Congress-though Madison was soon to argue that the President's authority to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," US Const, Art II, § 3, was purely ceremonial. See Ana of 
II. DEFENSE
At the same time President Washington informed the House and Senate of what he had done to keep the Nation out of war, he urged them to strengthen the national defenses. For even the best efforts to stay out of trouble might not succeed, and in any event, "[i]f we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace,... it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."° Congress took its time in responding, but ultimately it enacted a package of defense measures that illuminated a number of aspects of congressional war powers.
A. The Scope of Federal Authority
Pursuant to its explicit authority "to raise and support Armies,"" Congress provided for the fortification of harbors, 7 2 the establishment of arsenals and armories, 73 and the enlistment of Recognizing that national defenses ought not depend on the will of any individual state, Congress provided in the same section authority to acquire the necessary land by purchase, indicating an understanding that clause 17 was not meant to limit the authority implicit in other provisions, but only to provide a means for acquiring the power of "exclusive legislation" over areas acquired for the stated purposes. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. v Lowe, 114 US 525, 530 (1885).
A different question of the meaning of clause 17 was raised when the President called Congress's attention to the fact that several states had qualified their cessions of lighthouses to the United States by reserving the right to serve process within the ceded areas. 4 Annals of Cong 36 (Jan 21, 1794). Congress approved these reservations, suggesting that it read the constitutional provision giving it the power of "exclusive legislation" over such areas not to require it to exclude state authority entirely. additional troops. 4 Similarly, although no Navy Department was yet established, 7 5 Congress laid the foundations for the Navy by authorizing the construction or purchase of six frigates 7 6 and ten galleys" under its power "[tlo provide and maintain a Navy." 78 In addition, Congress authorized the President to require the executives of the various states to hold a specified number of militiamen "in readiness to march at a moment's warning," 79 presumably as an incident to employing them, under the authority provided two years earlier, to repel any possible invasion.
8
Less obvious perhaps in their constitutional bases were two further measures taken by the Third Congress: a ban on arms exports 8 ' and an embargo on the departure of ships bound for foreign ports. 8 2 In the literal sense both were regulations of foreign commerce, unless one is prepared to accept a distinction between regulations and prohibitions that is more formal than substantial 83 and that cannot be justified in terms of the known purposes of the Commerce Clause." The protective tariff proviAct of May 9, 1794, 1 Stat 366. See also Act of Mar 3, 1795, 1 Stat 430. In a paragraph largely devoted to improvement of the militia, Washington alluded to the desirability of providing "an opportunity for the study of those branches of the military art which can scarcely ever be attained by practice alone." 4 Annals of Cong 12 (Dec 3, 1793). Jefferson had advised the President a few days earlier that Congress had no authority to establish a military academy, though it seems preposterous to deny that the power to raise and support armies includes the power to train them. See Ana of Nov 23, 1793, in Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 182 (cited in note 19). Congress did not act on Washington's suggestion; it was not until 1802 that the academy at West Point was founded, and then on the initiative of President Jefferson. See Act of Mar 16, 1802 § 27, 2 Stat 132, 137; James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783 -1812 280, 288-89 (Princeton 1947 .
7' Earlier in the session Madison had bravely opposed the creation of a Navy on the ground that it would be cheaper to go on paying tribute to the Barbary pirates. Madison defended indemnity on the basis of the law of nations without saying why the law of nations was a source of congressional power; he might have argued it was necessary and proper to the encouragement of commerce. Compare the arguments for indemnity of officers and others injured in the Whiskey Rebellion, which was defended as a means of encouraging support for suppressing the insurrection and thus as necessary and proper to enforcing the laws. See 4 Annals of Cong 984-87, 989-1002 (Dec 16-17, 19, 1794 ; see also text accompanying note 136.
Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, who would have established a fund for indemnification by sequestering debts owed to British subjects, defended his proposal as part of the overall defense package. 4 Annals of Cong 535 (Mar 27, 1794). Elias Boudinot, also of New Jersey, who opposed this measure on policy grounds, conceded that the power to sequester debts in reprisal for hostile acts was both recognized by the law of nations and implicit in the greater power to declare war. Id at 537. See Miller, Federalist Era at 151-52 (cited in note 2) (adding that Hamilton "did not doubt that sequestration would lead to war... in the worst of causes-to enable debtors to escape from paying their creditors their just dues").
See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 781-82 (cited in note 6). The title of the Act described one of its purposes as "encouraging the Importation" of arms, and § 5 removed import duties on arms for a period of two years. See Act of May 22, 1794, 1 Stat at 370.
b7 Representative Sedgwick, who proposed the embargo, defended it as a means of preventing Great Britain from supplying her Caribbean possessions in the event of an attack on the French West Indies. See 4 Annals of Cong 500-04 (Mar 12, 1794). In 1793, however, Jefferson had denied that either the law of nations or U.S. policy required a ban on selling arms to belligerents; it was enough that the neutrality proclamation had warned arms traders that the Government would not protect them. In order to finance this array of defense measures 9 " Congress increased tariffs on specified imports 9 ' and imposed excises on retailers of wines and foreign spirits, 92 on snuff and refined sugar, 3 and on auction sales. 9 4 There was no serious constitutional objection to any of these measures. Tariffs had been enacted in 1789, and the new excises were indistinguishable from that assessed on whiskey producers in 1791."
A levy of one to ten dollars to be paid by the owners of carriages, attacked as a "direct" tax not apportioned among the states according to population as required by Article I, § § 2 and 9, provoked a significant debate over the meaning of that concededly vague constitutional term. Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts and John Nicholas of Virginia agreed that (as Dexter put it) "all taxes are direct which are paid by the citizen without being recompensed by the consumer" but differed as to whether the carriage tax could be passed on. 96 William Vans Murray of Maryland thought the tax on carriages no different from that previously imposed on stills; 97 Samuel Smith of Maryland responded that, unlike carriages, stills were taxed only when they were used. 9 guments that would dominate the opinions of the several Justices when the Supreme Court upheld the tax: "[I]t would astonish the people of America to be informed that they had made a Constitution by which pleasure carriages and other objects of luxury were excepted from contributing to the public exigencies," and "as several of the States had few or no carriages, no such apportionment could be made." 99 The tax was enacted;.. 0 the debates do not reveal a consensus as to why it was not "direct."
B. The President and Congress
More important at the time than the questions of federalism raised by the defense measures taken by the Third Congress were those of the separation of powers.
Representative Sedgwick had originally proposed that the decision whether to impose an embargo be left to the President: "On great occasions, confidence must be reposed in the Executive."'' Congress's decision to impose the embargo by joint resolution suggests a preference for reserving to itself the basic policy decision. Yet before adjourning, Congress delegated to the President authority to lay a new embargo during the legislative recess "whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require" and "under such regulations as the circumstances... may require," 2 and no one is reported as suggesting any constitutional problem with this measure." 3 Similarly, although the number of galleys the President could construct or acquire was limited to ten after Madison insisted the statute must specify a number,' no one is recorded as having objected to the fact that the President was given virtually unlimited discretion to resolve the more fundamental question whether to build them at all, the statute authorizing him to do so if it "shall appear to him necessary for the protection of the United States."'
The absence of objection was the more notable because, just a few days before, the House had emphatically rejected a bill that would have authorized but not required the President to raise an additional ten thousand troops after William Branch Giles of Virginia' and Madison had complained that it effectively transferred to the President Congress's power "to raise ... armies""' 7 -an especially dangerous delegation, Madison added, in view of the Framers' clear decision to separate the power to raise troops from the power to command them.' 8 Madison thus succeeded in preventing a delegation to the President of discretion whether or not to raise troops, but not in his further effort to provide that the troops that were raised "should only be employed for the protection of the frontier." 0 9
He did not argue that the Constitution limited the discretion the President could be given in determining how the troops should be employed, and indeed one can make the argument that his proposal would impermissibly have limited the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief."' The same policy of separation that Madison invoked to deny that the President could raise troops, combined with the Framers' patent desire to avoid the inefficiencies and dangers of entrusting tactical and strategic decisions to a committee,"' suggests that Congress infringes on the President's powers if it attempts to exercise the power of command. The counterargument is that defining the purposes for 109 His proposed amendment to this effect received only twenty-six votes. See 4 Annals of Cong 1221 (Feb 13, 1795) .
11 See US Const, Art II, § 2. This argument was apparently not made either; both sides treated the question as one purely of policy.
"' "Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." Federalist 74 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 447 (cited in note 34).
HeinOnline --63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 22 1996 which troops can be used is not a question of military tactics or strategy, but rather one of those basic policy decisions reserved to Congress by the various grants of legislative war powers. Arguably the question whether to employ troops is implicit in the question whether to fight, which Congress makes under its authority to declare war; arguably the power to raise troops includes authority to determine the purposes for which they may be used.
Yet another kind of separation-of-powers objection was raised when Abraham Clark of New Jersey asked the House to go beyond the embargo to forbid the importation of any articles produced in Great Britain or Ireland." Defended as a classic regulation of commerce, which it was,"' this "nonintercourse" proposal was assailed as an invasion of the power of the President and Senate to make treaties, for the preamble of Clark's resolution revealed that its purpose was to put economic pressure on Britain to make reparations for violations of our neutral rights and to evacuate forts within our territory still occupied in defiance of the 1783 peace treaty." President Washington, as Sedgwick observed, had just sent a special envoy to England to negotiate on those very issues; to ban imports until Britain yielded on those points would dictate to the President what treaty to make. 1 5 If this argument sounds familiar, it is because it is essentially the converse of the arguments the friends of France had made against the neutrality proclamation." 6 By committing us to peace, it was then urged, the President obstructed Congress's authority to declare war; by cutting off trade, it was now insisted, Congress would impede the President's exercise of the treaty power. 
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One can distinguish the cases, if one likes, on the ground that in issuing his proclamation, President Washington disclaimed any intention of committing the country to anything more than an observance of its international obligations pending Congress's decision whether or not to declare war. On a more fundamental plane, however, both incidents demonstrate the perspicacity of Hamilton's insight in defense of the proclamation: in many matters involving foreign relations, the President and Congress have overlapping powers. 1 1 v Congress's authority to regulate commerce is as explicit as the President's authority to negotiate treaties. What one may do may frustrate the exercise of authority by the other. But there is no warrant in the Constitution for giving precedence to either; this is one of those situations in which, for better or worse, the Framers knowingly sacrificed coherence and efficiency in the interest of separation of powers.
III. ST. DOMINGO
The most important spending controversy during the Third Congress concerned appropriations for the relief of refugees from disturbances in the French colony on the West Indian island of Hispaniola, known in the debates by the name of St. Domingo.
A number of French citizens had landed in Baltimore in the last days of 1793,118 where they had been supported by private and state contributions. Responding to a petition for federal assistance, a House committee urged that federal funds be made available," and they were, 2 ' but not until after yet another debate on the limits of the power to spend.
Virtually everyone wanted to help. Nicholas, doubting that Congress had authority "to bestow the money of their constituents on an act of charity," declared his willingness to tell the voters he had exceeded his powers and throw himself on their mercy.' 2 ' "In a case of this kind," Clark trumpeted, "we were not to be tied up by the Constitution. Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, always an exponent of broad federal authority, trotted out the General Welfare Clause once again. 3 But although he professed to think it obvious that relief of Caribbean refugees came within that provision, it was not; even so latitudinarian an interpreter as Justice Story would later express doubt that the "general welfare of the United States" would be served by expenditures for building foreign palaces or "for propagating Mahometanism among the Turks."' 24 As in the recent codfish controversy,' Madison found a way out of the dilemma that would enable Congress to satisfy the obligations of fraternit6 without "establishing a dangerous precedent, which might hereafter be perverted to the countenance of purposes very different from those of charity." 6 The United States owed money to France for assistance provided during the Revolution; Congress should authorize relief for the refugees in partial payment of this obligation. ' 2 7 That is what Congress did,' and thus the question of the meaning of the General Welfare Clause was avoided once again.' 29 gress, respecting the right to ignore limitations in appropriation laws in an emergency. " In response to pleas for relief from New England cod fisherman economically pressed by foreign and domestic duties and competitors' "bounties" (subsidies), the Senate in early 1791 sent to the House a bill providing for the payment of a bounty-based on the size of the boats and the quantity of fish caught-to owners of vessels employed in cod fisheries. Several representatives, including Madison, objected that Congress had no authority to grant bounties, but others replied that Congress could do so under the taxing, spending, and commerce powers. In the end, Madison broke the impasse: while disavowing bounties as both dangerous and unnecessary, he suggested that the subsidy be considered a reimbursement for the domestic duties extracted from the cod fishermen. Thus Congress was merely paying a debt, not granting a bounty. His position satisfied both sides-the fishermen got their money, and the statute provided for an "allowance," rather than a bounty. See Currie, 90 Nw U L Rev (cited in note 9). 126 4 Annals of Cong 170 (Jan 10, 1794). 17 4 Annals of Cong 170-71 (Jan 10, 1794). One of the express purposes for which taxes may be laid and collected, of course, is "to pay the Debts... of the United States." US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 1.
"Z See Act of Feb 12, 1794 § 3, 6 Stat at 13 ("[T]he amount thereof shall be provisionally charged to the debit of the French Republic, subject to such future arrangements as shall be made thereon, between the government of the United States and the said Republic.").
" A month later, following the precedent of subsidy by tax forgiveness established in the codfish case, see note 125, Congress also forgave the tonnage duties assessed on the ship that had brought the refugees to this country. Act of Mar 7, 1794, 1 Stat 342.
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IV. INSURRECTION
Congress was not in session in August 1794, when resistance to the liquor excise in western Pennsylvania became ugly. Pursuant to the authority Congress had given him two years before, 3 ' President Washington recited Justice Wilson's finding that ordinary processes were insufficient to enforce the laws, ordered the insurgents to disperse, and gave notice that he was taking steps to call out the militia.' 3 ' When this warning was ignored, he marched the militia to the rebellious counties in person, and the insurrection melted away before him.' 32 By the time Congress reassembled in November it was all over. The President told Congress what he had done.' 33 Congress commended him" M and appropriated money to cover the cost of the expedition,' 3 5 which he had undertaken in the reasonable expectation that Congress would pay for it later. Congress also authorized the expenditure of $8,500 to indemnify federal officers and citizens who had supported them for property destroyed by the mob-an expenditure obviously necessary and proper, like the officers' salaries, to the execution of the laws. The President sensibly pardoned all who had taken part in the uprising," ' including-in accord with the understanding expressed in the Philadelphia Convention-those who had not yet been put on trial."' Thus the Whiskey Rebellion came to a happy end; the new Government had survived its first crisis, to nearly everyone's satisfaction, and it had acted in full compliance with the Constitution. Along the way, however, the President had made one serious mistake. In his otherwise measured address to Congress, he had accused "certain self-created societies" of encouraging the insurrection.' 3 9 Everyone knew what "societies" the President had in mind: the Democratic Societies, sometimes disparagingly called Jacobin Clubs, which had sprung up all over the country in the enthusi- asm created by the French Revolution. 4 ' When Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania moved to insert in the House's ceremonial reply to the President's speech a paragraph expressing "reprobation" of these Societies,' the friends of France exploded in wrath. If the Societies offended the law, said Giles, let them be brought to justice; but it was not the House's business to act as a board of censure or "to attempt checking or restraining public opinion."' The Constitution gave Congress no authority to denounce private associations; members of the societies had "the inalienable privilege of thinking, of speaking, of writing, and of printing"; the proposal "confounded the innocent with the guilty" and condemned them all without a hearing. ' Madison, who had voted with Giles less than two years earlier to condemn Alexander Hamilton without a hearing,' called the measure a vote of attainder;" Thomas Carnes of Georgia said it would infringe freedom of speech and assembly.'
For a week the House debated nothing but its reply to the President's speech. The occasion was trivial but the principle important; the debate presaged the arguments over the Sedition Act.' 47 Murray said he would not vote to abolish the Democratic Societies, but he saw nothing wrong in warning the people against them;' 8 Madison responded that, as the infamous list of "subversive" organizations compiled by the Attorney General taught us a century and a half later, denunciation was punishment too. 4 9 Dexter offered a more sinister defense of the censure proposal. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts had already argued, with considerable justice, that the right of assembly did not embrace a conspiracy to obstruct the laws; 5 Dexter asserted that the Constitution gave no one "the precious right of vilifying and misrepresenting their own Government and laws."' Ames assailed the Societies for their secrecy 52 and professed to find the very existence of private associations as intermediaries between citizens and their government a threat to republican principles.
53
Cooler heads ultimately prevailed, and the response was watered down greatly:
when, at the insistence of many of those who objected to criticizing the Democratic Societies, it had applauded the new French constitution. (Nov 26, 1794) . The Senate, the reader will recall, still had not admitted the public to its deliberations.
" Political societies, he argued, served as "a substitute for representation"; when they acted in the name of those who were not members, they committed "an usurpation"; the result was "the power of the few over the many"; "[i]f the clubs prevail, they will be the Government. And we learn, with the greatest concern, that any misrepresentations whatever, of the Government and its proceedings, either by individuals or combinations of men, should have been made, and so far credited as to foment the flagrant outrage which has been committed on the laws.M There was no denunciation of the Democratic Societies as such, by name or by innuendo; there was no disparagement of the right to assemble--"concern" over "misrepresentations" is not necessarily inconsistent with the right to criticize the government. But the gulf between the developing parties in Congress was deeper and more hostile than ever, and it was clear that some members had a pretty narrow view of what the First Amendment meant by freedom of speech.
V. CITIZENSHIP
Congress had passed a hospitable naturalization law in 1790."55 It passed a more niggardly one in 1795.156
The new statute clarified two important points left unanswered in 1790. First, it mooted the controversy over whether Congress's naturalization power was exclusive, as its purpose seemed to suggest,' 5 7 by providing that citizenship could be acquired only as provided in the act itself. 5 ' The uncontested assumption seemed to be that exclusivity was necessary and proper to the exercise of congressional authority to provide a "uniform" rule, as it clearly was.
The second clarification made it explicit that naturalization proceedings could be brought in federal as well as state courts. 5 9 It was surely appropriate that some federal agency share the burden of passing upon applications for national citizenship. To the twentieth-century observer, it is less obvious that that agency should be the courts. As under the pension law, which the courts had struck down for other reasons, 6 ' the typi- cal proceeding was ex parte; unless the Government chose to oppose a particular application-which the 1795 statute did not say it had the right to do--it was difficult to see how there was a "case" or "controversy" of the adversarial nature that we have come to understand to be required by Article III."'1 There is no suggestion in the Annals that anyone in Congress shared this understanding in 1795.
But the main point of the new statute was to make it more difficult to become a citizen.' 6 2 Congress extended the two-year residence requirement to five years. It also required the applicant to announce his intention to become a citizen three years in advance and to renounce allegiance to his former sovereign." More interesting to the constitutional scholar were two additional restrictions: the applicant was required to disclaim any foreign title or order of nobility, and to have "behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same."" The latter condition enjoyed broad support. Sedgwick had begun the debate by warning of the perils of unchecked immigration from despotic and war-torn Europe: people who had not been brought up in a republic could not be expected to absorb its virtues overnight, and people from nations at war with one another could not be expected to get along. 6 ' Giles, from the opposite judiciary). end of the political spectrum, moved to require proof that the applicant was "attached to a Republican form of Government," in order "to prevent those poisonous communications from Europe, of which gentlemen were so much afraid." 6 ' There was much quibbling over the word "Republican," which had been appropriated by Madison and Jefferson's party; there was some objection to requiring the testimony of two witnesses, which was alleged to impose an undue burden on the poor. 6 7 Only Madison called attention to the more fundamental problem:
It [is] hard to make a man swear that he prefer[s] the Constitution of the United States, or to give any general opinion, because he may, in his own private judgment, think Monarchy or Aristocracy better and yet be honestly determined to support this Government as he finds it. 6 ' He did not put this objection on constitutional grounds, but the bitter lessons of the McCarthy period enable us to do so: a test of political orthodoxy for dispensing government benefits impinges on values protected by the First Amendment.' 69 Possibly in response to Madison's criticism, the requirement of actual endorsement of constitutional principles was replaced by the more innocuous insistence on a finding that the applicant had behaved like a person attached to our Constitution'9m--which was perhaps to say only that he must have been a law-abiding denizen. The doctrinal foundation for a constitutional attack on the original political test, moreover, was laid when the irrepressible Giles moved to add the requirement that the applicant renounce any preexisting titles.' 7 '
William Smith of South Carolina protested that Congress had no power to deprive anyone of his titles. 72 Dexter added 16 4 Annals of Cong 1021 (Dec 26, 1794) .
'
Id at 1021-23.
16
Id at 1022-23. the analogy that constitutionalized Madison's objection to a political test: "An alien might as well be obliged to make a renunciation of his connexions with the Jacobin club. The one was fully as abhorrent to the Constitution as the other." 73 Giles, echoed by John Page of Virginia, gave the response later made familiar by Justice Holmes: no one was being deprived of anything; the nobleman could keep his title by not becoming a citizen. 74 Dexter threw the House into an uproar by blandly announcing that he would be happy to vote for the proposal if Giles would agree to an amendment requiring the applicant to renounce not only his titles but also his slaves.' 75 Giles affected injury: "He was sorry to see slavery made a jest of in that House .... It had no proper connexion with the subject before the House." 76 John Heath of Virginia, who seldom spoke, swallowed the bait in a single gulp: since Congress could not forbid the importation of slaves, it could not require their renunciation as a condition of citizenship. 77 That, of course, was precisely Dexter's point:
3 Id at 1031. 174 Id at 1034 (Rep Giles); id at 1035 (Rep Page); McAuliffe v Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 29 NE 517, 517 (1892) (Holmes) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."). Madison, who appeared to perceive the dangers of this approach, took a different tack that served to distinguish the Jacobin example: it was proper to require renunciation of hereditary titles because they were "proscribed by the Constitution." 4 Annals of Cong 1035 (Jan 1, 1795). See also id at 1039 (Rep Scott). Uriah Tracy of Connecticut set Madison straight: while Article I, § 9 forbade the United States to grant titles and federal officers to accept them, nothing in the Constitution prevented private citizens from receiving foreign titles, much less retaining those they had previously possessed. 4 Annals of Cong 1053 (Jan 2, 1795).
"' 4 Annals of Cong 1039 (Jan 1, 1795). Thatcher twisted the knife by moving, as a second amendment, "and that he never will possess them." Id.
17 Id. Similarly, when an unidentified member of the House suggested dropping the requirement that the militia be limited to white persons he was greeted with a cold reminder of political correctness: "[Tihe subject was obviously and extremely improper for public discussion." 4 Annals of Cong 1234 (Feb 17, 1795 ). Yet it was the Third Congress that, in response to yet another petition from the Quakers, 4 Annals of Cong 249 (Jan 20, 1794), forbade sailing from the United States for the purpose of exporting slaves or of transporting inhabitants of one foreign country into slavery in another. Act of Mar 22, 1794, 1 Stat 347. Neither of these provisions fell within the twenty-year moratorium on congressional powers contained in Article I, § 9, and Congress evidently surmounted any doubts as to whether such provisions came within the commerce power, as the House had concluded in 1790. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 792-94 (cited in note 6). The Annals report no debate on these interesting provisions. Dexter's conclusion was not unavoidable; some discretion as to who is an acceptable member of the community is obviously implicit in the authority to enact a uniform naturalization rule. Yet Dexter's reminder that this discretion must be limited if it was not to impinge on individual or state rights was welcome. The House had already debated the difficult problem of unconstitutional conditions in 1791, when it voted down a proposal to limit the political activities of revenue officers. 78 The Third Congress decreed that new citizens must renounce their titles but not their slaves; 9 its successors would have ample opportunities to wrestle with the analogous question of what conditions could permissibly be attached to federal grants 8° or to the admission of new states. 181 The Constitution in Congress
VI. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
For the second time in two years a judicial interpretation of the Constitution commanded congressional attention. When the Justices had struck down the pension law in Hayburn's Case,' Congress had amended the statute.' 83 When the Supreme Court held in Chisholm v Georgia that one state could be sued by the citizens of another," Congress decided it was the Constitution that needed amending.
The text of Article III seemed to support the Chisholm decision: "The Judicial Power shall extend to ... Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State.. .. "" Suits against unconsenting sovereigns, however, were unknown when the Constitution was written, and prominent framers from Madison to Marshall had assured the country that nothing in Article III would permit the states to be sued. 1 8 6 The decision, as one commentator has written, "fell upon the country with a profound shock." 87 Newspapers representing a rainbow of opinion protested what they viewed as an unexpected blow to state sovereignty." Others spoke more concretely of prospective raids on state treasuries.' 8 9 Georgia's House of Representatives passed a bill providing that anyone attempting to execute process in the Chisholm case should be "guilty of felony and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy, by being hanged." 90 The adverse reaction was not universal. 9 ' But other state legislatures called for a constitutional amendment to reverse the Court's decision,' 92 and one was introduced in the House the 2 The Massachusetts legislature, for example, finding Chisholm "repugnant to the first principles of a federal government," requested the state's Representatives and instructed its Senators to take all necessary steps to bring about an amendment that would day after Chisholm was announced.' 93 Amendment was one of the Senate's first priorities when Congress reconvened in December 1793, and by mid-March the proposal was on its way to the states.'" President Adams proclaimed its ratification in 1798.'9' Thenceforth, said the Eleventh Amendment, "the Judicial power of the United States sh[ould] not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 6 The Annals report no debate on the amendment. Each House discussed and endorsed it in a single day, almost without dissent. 1 7 It is plain that just about everybody in Congress agreed that the Supreme Court had misread the Constitution. 9 8 Notwithstanding this apparent consensus, there were three revealing attempts to water down the proposal. An unidentified Senator moved to limit the reach of the amendment so that it would bar only suits in which "the cause of action shall have arisen before the ratification of the amendment. -31, 477-78 (Jan 14, 1794; Mar 4, 1794 All three of these limiting proposals were rejected. 0 3 Congress was unwilling to permit suits against states on future causes of action, or in cases in which no other forum was available, or 2C, 4 Annals of Cong 476 (Mar 4, 1794) . 201 Born in Switzerland, Gallatin had come to the United States in 1780, engaged in farming, fought in the Revolution, taught French at Harvard, and taken an oath of allegiance to Virginia in 1785. When named to the Senate in 1793, he was challenged and unseated (after the Senate had taken action on the proposed amendment) on the ground that he had not been nine years a citizen of the United States, as Article I, § 3 required. See 4 Annals of Cong 19, 47-62 (Dec 11, 1793; Feb 20-28, 1794) . Like the case of William Smith, see Currie, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 173-74 (cited in note 9), Gallatin's exclusion raised difficult questions of defining citizenship before the new Constitution took effect. As in Smith's case, the result was inconclusive; Gallatin lost by an unexplained vote of fourteen to twelve that appeared to be on what we would now call party lines. Two contests over House elections during the Third Congress made clear that, in exercising its responsibility to judge the elections of its members, the House was generally to apply state law. See 4 Annals of Cong 145-47, 148, 442-44, 453-55 (Dec 20, 24, 1793; Feb 10, 14, 1794); Matthew St. Clair Clarke and David A. Hall, Cases of Contested Elections in Congress 69-77 (Gales & Seaton 1834) . As a general matter there was nothing surprising in this conclusion, since, as was pointed out in debate, Article I, § 4 expressly provided that state law should regulate the "times, places and manner" of holding congressional elections until Congress legislated a federal rule. 4 Annals of Cong 147 (Dec 20, 1793) . The Delaware law that the House applied in the second case, however, required voters to pick two candidates for Representative, one of whom resided outside their own county. See also Article II, § 1, which makes an analogous provision for presidential elections. Whether the Residence Clause related to the "manner" of holding elections or to the qualifications of the candidate, and whether the states had authority to add to the qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence prescribed in Article I, § 2, the House apparently did not discuss.
The Annals also report a brief contretemps over the seating of one Gabriel Duvall, who had presented credentials as a Representative from Maryland in the place of John Francis Mercer, whose election had created a controversy only two years before. See 4 Annals of Cong 742 (May 31, 1794); 3 Annals of Cong 205-07 (Nov 22, 1791) . Once a committee report was read finding that Mercer had resigned, Duvall was awarded his seat, which he occupied for the next sixteen months without ever opening his mouth-suggesting that his brief service in the House was a fertile training ground for the exemplary record of insignificance he was to compile in the twenty-five years he spent on the Supreme Court. Sovereign immunity is not fashionable today. Nor is it an attractive principle. When governments commit wrongs, they ought to be brought to book. When they violate federal rights, or the rights of citizens of other states or nations, they ought to be suable in federal court. But that was neither the view of the Third Congress nor the view of the state legislatures that approved its proposal.
The fate of Gallatin's modest request not to leave our foreign relations at the mercy of individual states should put to rest the modern heresy that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to federal-question cases. 2 One can imagine a scenario in which a motion to exempt treaty cases is voted down as unnecessary because the amendment itself is inapplicable to cases arising under federal law. But the language of the actual amendment is not conducive to such an interpretation; it flatly bars "any suit in law or equity" by diverse plaintiffs against a state. More important, the historical context belies any attempt at wishful thinking: as the prompt rejection of all ameliorating alterations shows, Congress was in no mood to permit any federal suit against a state by a citizen of another state or of a foreign country.
VII. THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
On April 3, 1794, President Washington signed into law an obscure little bill transferring the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for New Hampshire to the Circuit Court of that district, "until the end of the next session of Congress, or until a new district judge be appointed in that district, and no If the office of District Judge for New Hampshire had been vacant, we might have relegated the incident to a footnote as an example of ingenuity in ensuring that federal judicial business not be interrupted-wondering aloud why the President did not see that the vacancy was filled and whether, in assigning jurisdiction to the Circuit Court, Congress was not effectively usurping the power of appointment. But the office was not vacant. It had been occupied since 1789 by one John Sullivan, who for some time had been unable to perform his judicial duties.
John Sullivan was a war hero. Fighting beside Washington at battles from Long Island to Brandywine, he had risen to the rank of Major-General. When the Revolution was over he served in the Confederation Congress and as President (Governor) of New Hampshire. He was a leader in the struggle to ratify the Philadelphia Constitution 0 6 and "a logical choice" for appointment as the state's first federal judge 2 7 -"the only position in the appointment of the President," one biographer ominously observed, "his health permitted him to accept." 0 '
At the time of his appointment Sullivan was still President of New Hampshire, and he did not immediately resign. The state legislature protested that it was improper for him to hold both offices at once, but did nothing. 0 9 The federal Constitution makes clear that federal judges cannot simultaneously be members of Congress; 2 10 it says nothing about holding federal and state offices at the same time. One is tempted to mumble something about the spirit of the Constitution.
Sullivan resigned his state office in June 1790. It was not until a year later that the first case came before his federal court. Even then he was "not... particularly occupied by his judicial duties," and by 1792 he had reached such a state of drunkenness and senility that he was incapable of sitting at all. 21 ' At the urging of his "friends," Sullivan elected not to resign. Some person "over eager for the advancement of a friend" suggested that Washington do something about Sullivan; the President is said to have replied that "there was no man in the country he would not sooner remove than General Sullivan. " "
The truth of the matter was that the Framers had arguably made a mistake: in their commendable zeal to ensure an independent judicial branch, 213 they had neglected to provide any tools for removing an incompetent judge.
Impeachment, of course, required proof of "high Crimes [or] Misdemeanors," not mere inability to fulfill one's duties. 4 Later judges who approached Sullivan's lamentable condition were coaxed off the bench by their colleagues, 215 though they did not always react with grace. 216 But there was no way of making them go, and President Washington was unwilling even to try.
It was in this pitiful state of affairs that a House committee was charged with the task of devising a remedy in the event of the incapacity of a federal judge. 1 7 The result we know already: a bill to transfer Sullivan's duties to the Circuit Court, 1 8 which was adopted without recorded debate. 2 9 The crisis was real, the temptation great, the benefit clear: federal judicial business could once again be done in New Hampshire. The cost was greater, the action unforgivable: all Congress had to do to rid itself of a judge of whose opinions it disapproved was transfer his jurisdiction to another court. It is true that, since Article III vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and "such inferior Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish," the legislature has a good deal of discretion in defining the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 22° But unbridled legislative authority to transfer cases from one court to another makes a mockery of the constitutional guarantee that federal judges hold office "during good Behaviour." 2 21 The obvious remedy was to amend the Impeachment Clause to make incapacity a basis for the removal of a federal judge. After all, only a month had passed since Congress had proposed another constitutional amendment to correct a perceived deficiency in the jurisdictional provisions of Article III.2 To be sure, a willful House and Senate could always cook up "incapacity" where none existed; 2 but they could cook up "high crimes and misdemeanors" too, as they demonstrated in removing Sullivan's unhappy successor in 1804.224 The process by which Congress dealt with Sullivan in 1794 was subject to greater abuse than any plausible impeachment standard, for no finding of misconduct or even inadequacy-and no two-thirds vote of the Senate-was necessary to transfer jurisdiction from one court to another.
Perhaps the most charitable explanation for Congress's unfortunate action is that time was of the essence: judicial business in New Hampshire could not comfortably await ratification by three-fourths of the states. It seems not to have occurred to Congress in 1794, as it later would, that the good behavior standard See text accompanying notes 193-98. As Story observed: "An attempt to fix the boundary between the region of ability and inability would much oftener give rise to personal, or party attachments and hostilities, than advance the interests of justice, or the public good. And instances of absolute imbecility would be too rare to justify the introduction of so dangerous a provision." Story, might permit the creation of statutory machinery for circumventing an incompetent judge by the action of his judicial peers 225 a procedure that, while diminishing the independence of the individual judge, does no violence to the central principle that the judiciary must be free from interference by the other branches it is expected to police.
VIII. THE SOUTHWEST DELEGATE
When the Third Congress convened for the second time in Philadelphia in November 1794, James White laid before the House his credentials as "Representative of the Territory of the United States South of the river Ohio, in the Congress of the United States." 2 26 He was eventually seated, but only after a heated debate that went to the very nature of the House.
It was Zephaniah Swift, a new member from Connecticut, who raised the objection:
The Constitution has made no provision for such a member as this person is intended to be. If we can admit a Delegate to Congress or a member of the House of Representatives, we may with equal propriety admit a stranger from any quarter of the world. 22 ' Article I, § 2 seemed to support him: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen... by the people of the several States." 228 There were two arguments for seating the gentleman from the Southwest Territory, and William Smith espoused them both. First, he said, Mr. White was entitled to a seat "by the terms of an express compact with the people." 22 9 What that meant was spelled out in the report of an ad hoc committee. 2 " The Northwest Ordinance had promised the residents of the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, once they established a legislature, the right to send "a delegate to Congress,... with a right of debating, but not of voting." 231 After the new Constitution took effect, Congress had passed a statute giving this ordinance "[f]ull effect." 232 In conformity with the Act whereby North Carolina ceded to the United States the area that became the Southwest Territory, 23 3 the Act of Congress establishing that territory granted its inhabitants "all the privileges, benefits, and advantages" set forth in the Northwest Ordinance. 2 
"
Of course no "compact" or Act of Congress could authorize what the Constitution forbade, and Article I seemed pretty clear that only the people of the states were entitled to representation in Congress. As far as the Northwest Territory was concerned, the promise in the Ordinance could plausibly be viewed as an engagement "entered into before [ ] the adoption of this Constitution" and thus, under Article VI, "as valid ... under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. " " 5 It is true that the entire Northwest Ordinance seemed to be unauthorized by the Articles of Confederation, 2 36 but it was generally accepted as valid; and thus there was a respectable argument that Article VI required Congress to seat a delegate sent by the Northwest Territory.
No delegate from that territory, however, appeared until 1799, when young William Henry Harrison presented his credentials to the Sixth Congress. 3 7 James White came from the Southwest Territory, which had not been organized until 1790. It had no "engagement" antedating the Constitution and thus could derive no comfort from Article VI.
The argument based on the Northwest Ordinance therefore boiled down to an argument based on tradition, however brief. If the seating of a nonvoting territorial delegate was consistent with the provision of the Articles of Confederation for selection of congressional delegates "in such manner as the legislature of each State shall direct," 2 3 it was consistent with Article I, § 2 as well.
Smith's second argument helped to explain how the admission of a nonvoting delegate could be reconciled with that provision. The House could admit anyone it liked for purposes of debate; it could admit the Secretary of State." 9 Indeed, Dayton added, the House had often called upon Cabinet officers for advice. 2 4 In other words, Article I, § 2 spoke only to the method of selecting "[miembers" of the House; as Madison observed in arguing that White was not required to take the oath prescribed by Article VI, 4 he was not a "member." 24 2 This argument posed in starkest form the question of what it meant to be a "member" of Congress. Only the people of the states were entitled to elect "members," but members engaged in a variety of activities. They introduced bills, sat on committees, made motions, spoke in debate, and cast votes. The question was which of these functions were so central to the operation of the House that they could be exercised only by representatives chosen in accordance with Article I, § 2.
Voting, it seemed to be agreed, was at the core of the member's office, 2 " and the Ordinance had been careful to make clear that territorial delegates would not have the right to vote. For voting is the act whereby Congress makes decisions and thus ' Articles of Confederation, Art V, § 1, reprinted in 1 Stat 4 (1778).
4 Annals of Cong 885-86 (Nov 17, 1794) (Rep Smith). See also id at 885 (Rep Giles) ("If the House chose to consult the gallery-a resource for information that he should never wish to see adopted-they had a right to consult it, or to ask advice from any other quarter, notwithstanding the assertion of the gentleman from Connecticut [Rep Smith]."). actually exercises its various powers; anyone who can vote on the floor of Congress is pretty clearly a "member."" 4 Mere speaking, it was argued, was another matter. But when the House had innocuously asked the Secretary of the Treasury even for written advice, there had been a storm of protest," and in the investigation of General St. Clair, the House had insisted on hearing from Cabinet members in committee, not before the House itself. 24 To be sure, admitting executive officers to congressional proceedings raises separation-of-powers concerns not present in the case of the Southwest Delegate. 2 47 But as Swift pointed out, it was one thing "[tlo admit a person within the bar for the purpose of consulting him"; it was quite another to let him "take a permanent seat among the members, for the purpose of regularly debating." 2 " Conceding that the Delegate's position was "infinitely higher" than "that of an advocate allowed to plead at the bar of the House," Baldwin insisted that it was nevertheless "extremely short of the situation of a member of Congress." 249 The House agreed with Baldwin; White was seated as a nonvoting Delegate from the Southwest Territory, in accordance with the tradition created by the Northwest Ordinance and the "compact" made when the territory was established." 0 Since he was not a member of the House, White was neither required to take the oath nor entitled to a member's rights; 2 5 ' Congress passed a law to provide him with franking privileges, reimbursement of expenses, and a salary, 252 all on the theory, one surmises, that these measures were necessary and proper to the operation of the House. All of this made very good sense, 25 and so long as the Delegate was not given powers so extensive as to make him effectively a member of the House, it was not impossible to reconcile it with the Constitution. 5 4 IX. THE FLAG Let us close this survey of the work of the Third Congress by retracing our steps for a moment to the opening days of its first session in January 1794, when the House was asked to take a breather from momentous issues of war and peace to endorse a Senate bill to add two stars and two stripes to the national flag.
There was some grumbling about the expense of replacing existing flags, and several members without souls complained that the matter was too trivial to deserve congressional attention. Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts protested that if the bill passed it would not be long before the flag became hopelessly unwieldy: "It is very likely, before fifteen years elapse, we shall consist of twenty States." 255 Boudinot pointed out that "the citizens of Vermont and Kentucky... might be affronted" if they two. Id at 890. At one point, Giles moved to limit the Delegate to speaking "upon any question touching the rights and interests of the people in the Territory," as to which it made most sense to permit him to speak; but he was happy to withdraw this motion when it attracted no support, saying he had advanced the idea only to make it easier to "get the resolution through the House." 4 Annals of Cong 887 (Nov 14, 1794) .
' This issue arose again in heightened form in 1993, when the House extended to five Delegates (who had been given the right to vote in standing committees in 1970) the right also to vote in the Committee of the Whole-except that, if their votes were decisive, a new vote would be taken without them. The District of Columbia Circuit upheld this arrangement in Michel v Anderson, 14 F3d 623 (1994) , relying largely on the First Congress's endorsement of the provision for a Delegate in the Northwest Ordinance and the powers exercised by William Henry Harrison (which included making motions and serving on committees) after his election to that position in 1799. Id at 631. (The more significant decision to seat the Southwest Delegate, after the constitutional question had been fully debated, was not mentioned in the opinion.) The court warned, however, that the House had gone to the limit; similar rights for mayors, or a power to affect the result in the Committee of the Whole, or a vote of any kind on the floor of the House itself, would be unconstitutional. Id at 630. These distinctions were all stated as a matter of fiat, and of course no voting rights followed from the eighteenth-century experience; the prevailing argument in 1794 was that all the Delegate could do was speak-a right that could be afforded to anyone.
4 Annals of Cong 164 (Jan 7, 1794).
were not acknowledged by stars and stripes of their own, and the bill became law. 256 No one questioned Congress's authority to enact it. The Constitution says nothing about flags. Congress must have understood the power to prescribe one to be inherent in nationhood: every country needs a flag, and the states were in no position to provide it. 25 Tradition supports this interpretation, as it supported the Third Congress in seating the Southwest Delegate, for the original flag of thirteen stars and stripes was adopted in 1777 by the Continental Congress, which had no express authority in the premises either. 25 The banner Congress approved in 1794 would remain our national emblem until 1818. It was this flag that inspired Francis Scott Key during the War of 1812, long after its fifteen stars and stripes had ceased to represent the true state of the Union. 25 9 When the number of states reached twenty, Congress was moved to act once more, and this time it made sure it would never have to be bothered again. From then on the flag was to consist of thirteen stripes and twenty stars, with a new star to be added on the admission of each new state. 260 Thus the stars were to represent all the states of the Union, the stripes the original thirteen, and as far as the flag was concerned we could all live happily ever after. note 257) . Goodhue, the reader will surely recall, had foreseen this problem in 1794. See text accompanying note 255.
